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source: Israel Hayom is Israel's most widely read Hebrew-language daily newspaper, and it is owned and published by billionaire Miriam Adelson and her family. Together with her late husband Sheldon Adelson, she has been one of the largest financial backers of Donald Trump's political career and administration. - Wikipedia

Turkey's strategic depth is now part of Israel's military calculus

Just because Turkey is a member state in NATO doesn't mean it is protected in Syria. Israel allegedly struck Syria's Abu al-Duhur air base before Turkish forces arrived. The doctrine: deny infrastructure before the flag lands – because once Turkish troops arrive, striking also risks Turkish casualties, retaliation, American intervention.

The defining fact of Israel's alleged strike on Abu al-Duhur is what was absent from the target: Turkish troops.

Eight hits targeted the runway and military facilities of the Syrian air base on August 18. No casualties were reported. Abu al-Duhur lies in Idlib, roughly 70 kilometers from the Turkish border. Israel later stated that Syria was about to breach an agreed security status quo by permitting Turkish forces to deploy there despite repeated Israeli warnings. Ankara denied that a deployment was planned.

Israel did not wait for Turkish troops, aircraft, radar or air defense systems. It destroyed the infrastructure required to receive them before the threat became entrenched. The operational rule is denial before things are entrenched. Before Turkish troops arrive, the target is infrastructure; once they arrive, striking it also risks Turkish casualties, retaliation, American intervention and confrontation with a NATO member. Those costs alter the calculation, not Israel's authority to decide.

The first Turkish soldier changes the price of every Israeli bomb that follows. He does not decide whether it falls. Jerusalem has studied not only how NATO's Article 5 operates, but where it applies. The treaty protects Turkish territory; Turkish troops do not carry that territory with them onto Syrian or occupied Cypriot soil. Turkish vessels and aircraft operating in the Mediterranean raise separate treaty questions, but even where Article 5 applies, collective action is not automatic. NATO acts by consensus, and each member state determines the response it deems necessary.

Ankara cannot carry NATO protection abroad in a uniform. Tom Barrack's response to Abu al-Duhur inverted responsibility. The US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria called the strike an unnecessary escalation, cited Turkey's lack of warning and called for stronger deconfliction. Israel had identified the prospective Turkish deployment as the threat, warned Damascus against permitting it and allegedly acted when Damascus ignored the warning. The escalation did not begin with the destruction of the runway; it began with the attempt to alter the military status quo on it.

Barrack repeatedly turns Turkish sensitivities into constraints to be managed and Israeli security requirements into escalation to b........
 

Israel, Gulf states pursue secret energy corridor to bypass Hormuz

source:ChatGPT
I found a very strong Israel Hayom match, but the passage you quoted appears to be a synthesis of several Israel Hayom pieces rather than a single article.

1. The Saudi/Gulf → Israel → Europe part is almost certainly this​

This is an exceptionally close match to the latter half of your quotation. Israel Hayom reports that:
  • Israel and Gulf states are discussing routes for Saudi/Gulf oil and gas to reach Europe through Israel.
  • One proposal involves Saudi oil going from Yanbu → Eilat → the Eilat–Ashkelon pipeline → the Mediterranean → Europe.
  • Longer-term proposals include pipelines from the Gulf to Aqaba → Eilat → Israel's Mediterranean coast.
  • Energy Minister Eli Cohen explicitly described an Israeli Mediterranean pipeline route as the “ideal option.”
  • The article connects the route to the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
  • It says the route would include oil and gas pipelines from Gulf states to the Mediterranean through Israel. (www.israelhayom.com)
So the line in your transcript:
“the Saudi and other Gulf countries oil and gas, pass it through pipelines, and then get it to Europe”
is very plausibly referring to this article.

2. The Crete/Cyprus/Leviathan → Europe part comes from an older Israel Hayom article​

This describes the planned EastMed gas pipeline:
Leviathan → Cyprus → Crete → Italy → Europe
Israel Hayom says the proposed 1,300-km subsea pipeline would transport gas from the Leviathan field to Cyprus, Crete and Italy, eventually putting Israeli gas into the European market. (Israel Hayom)
There is also a 2020 Israel Hayom article explicitly titled:
That is the underlying Israel–Cyprus–Greece–Europe energy corridor the transcript is describing. A later strategic assessment confirms the project was designed to connect Israeli gas reservoirs to Greece and Europe. (Mediterranean Strategic Studies Foundation)

3. The “cables” part is a separate but related corridor​

Israel Hayom has also described the EuroAsia Interconnector, connecting the electrical grids of Israel, Cyprus and Greece.
And its 2021 article on the Blue-Raman fibre-optic project describes Israel as a bridge between Europe and Saudi Arabia/India, noting the geopolitical significance of infrastructure crossing Israel. (www.israelhayom.com)
More importantly, Israel Hayom's discussion of Turkey's eastern Mediterranean strategy explicitly says Turkey's maritime claims could prevent Israel, Egypt and Cyprus from accessing Greece and European energy markets “by pipeline or cable.” (www.israelhayom.com)
So “energy cables” in your transcript is consistent with this broader infrastructure architecture, but I haven't found an Israel Hayom article using the exact phrase from the transcript.

4. The military-access claim is more complicated​

There is an Israel Hayom strategic argument that Greece/Cyprus are important to Israel's security architecture. For example, its 2021 article on the Mediterranean alignment says the Greece–Cyprus–Israel alignment has implications for Israeli national security in future emergencies. (www.israelhayom.com)
And more recent Israeli strategic commentary explicitly describes the region in terms of energy corridors, subsea cables, sea lanes, ports and military access. (GeoTrends)
But I didn't find an Israel Hayom article establishing the exact proposition that “Crete and Cyprus are Israel's strategic corridor to Europe for energy cables, shipping and military access.” That wording looks more like someone's interpretation/synthesis of several articles.

5. The Southern Lebanon/gas-fields claim is the red flag​

I cannot substantiate this part from Israel Hayom:
“the ones that they think that they are acquiring by taking southern Lebanon, which is the Lebanese gas fields off their coast”
I found Israel Hayom reporting on Lebanese offshore gas exploration, the Israel–Lebanon maritime boundary, Hezbollah and the Karish/Qana gas fields, but not evidence that Israel Hayom reported a plan to take Lebanon's gas fields by annexing southern Lebanon. For example, reporting on the maritime negotiations describes Lebanon's ability to explore its offshore fields rather than an Israeli plan to acquire them. (Elias Bejjani News)

Bottom line​

I would trace the quoted passage like this:
Claim in the quotationIsrael Hayom evidence
Leviathan → Cyprus → Crete → EuropeYes — very strong match (Israel Hayom)
Israel/Greece/Cyprus as European energy corridorYes (Mediterranean Strategic Studies Foundation)
Cables connecting Israel/Cyprus/GreeceYes, related reporting (www.israelhayom.com)
Gulf/Saudi oil & gas → Israel → EuropeYes — extremely strong match, Aug. 5, 2026 (www.israelhayom.com)
Shipping corridor bypassing Hormuz/Bab el-MandebYes — same Aug. 5 article (www.israelhayom.com)
Military/security corridor through Greece/CyprusBroadly supported, but not in that exact wording (www.israelhayom.com)
Israel intends to acquire Lebanese gas fields by taking southern LebanonI cannot substantiate this from Israel Hayom
Most likely, the speaker has stitched together the 2026 Gulf-energy article with the older EastMed/Israel–Cyprus–Greece material, then added an interpretation about southern Lebanon that isn't actually present in those Israel Hayom reports.
If by “duplication” you mean you want me to find the exact duplicated/republished Israel Hayom article or video transcript from which this speaker got the wording, I can dig specifically for that next.
 
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