I tried the FTSE service in the first half of 2003, after backtesting it (on the free facility offered) over the last months of 2002. As a long-only system, it was taking rather a beating at the time. but I think its results improved during the bull run of 2003, by which time I had given it up. There were some badly thought-out features, like the fact that the system treated a decision to risk 7% of capital rather than 10% as equivalent to reducing your stake per trade from £10k to £7k. It is obvious that if the risk % is a real risk parameter, the 7% solution will generate a totally different pattern of trades from the 10%. This is what I wrote at the time:
The headline facts were that the algorithm – not revealed in any detail – was supposed to pick up when the stock had dropped into a zone of value. Almost always, this appeared to mean when it was more than x% below the bottom of a supposed trading zone. This turned out to work very well for many stocks that traded in ranges – even where the rails were on a down-trend. The system does not sell out of a losing position until the stop is breached, and when the price is meandering around in a trading range, the discipline of not selling within the stop-loss limit makes it likelier that it will eventually wander towards the target. But, of course, sometimes it just walks randomly around for months, and then gets stopped, when any sentient decision maker would have either taken a small profit en route, or decided to move the capital to better use. No account is taken of carrying costs in this trading methodology.
For quite a lot of stocks, the system has shown very good returns both absolutely and relative to buy-and-hold. But it is bad at picking up and riding trends (it missed about a third of the long bull market in IMT) and made a horlicks of EMG (consistently cutting winning positions too early, mis-diagnosing tops and bottoms, thus missing three-quarters of the run to the top). RTR was a disaster, because the system persistently opened trades where the down-trend then dominated the expected rally.
I was also worried that on a sample of dates at the end of 2002 both the open positions and the closed positions were, on average, loss making. On 8th December, there were 97 stocks where the system was running a long position, and the average start date for these was 6th November. Overall, these positions were down by a little over 2 per cent on average. There were 10 stocks where there was no position, but the system was licking its wounds, having lost on average 4 per cent on the last set of positions it had opened in those stocks.
And then there is the major gap that, at least as released to the public, Tradequant does not give signals to open short positions. I suspect that if it did, the results would be somewhat better, and maybe even positive.
Finally, I should confess that despite my knowledge of these facts, my curiosity recently got the better of me, and I decided to take out a trial subscription (which was offered by ADVFN). This performed no better than my previous analysis would have led one to expect. On the range of stocks that I selected, the buy signals generated positions that would have lost an average of almost exactly 5% before commission from mid-February to date (mid-March). While this has been a dreadful period, no active trader should have done as badly as that, provided they were able to go short.
My conclusion is that it is very hard to see how a subscriber to the system can make a profit out of following its instructions in anything like recent markets. It may be that one could pick and choose, having regard to whether the system had a good prior record with particular stocks (eg it has been good at trading the Logica cycle), but that rather negates the point of the system, which is supposed to take judgement and emotion out of trading decisions.